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"MULTIPLE JEOPARDY" IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES
LEONARD E. COHEN* and MONTE FRIED**
INTRODUCTION
From 1935 until about 1960, the role of the Maryland labor
lawyer representing management was generally confined to company-
union relations and the federal sphere. Since Congress had enacted
statutes requiring national uniformity in labor policy, state and local
governments were preempted from enacting similar legislation affecting
employers in interstate commerce.' During this same period, neither
state nor local legislation was enacted in Maryland which significantly
affected employers engaged in intrastate activities. Therefore, the
rights and obligations of Maryland employers and employees were
determined primarily by federal law. An employee's remedies, other
than his common law right to sue for breach of contract, generally were
entrusted to the care and control of the National Labor Relations Board.
The role of the Maryland labor lawyer has, however, become
greatly expanded in the last decade due to the enactment, at all levels
of government, 2 of various statutes and ordinances which prohibit
discrimination in employment. These statutory enactments, together
with an expanded application of older legislation, affect all employees,
both union and non-union, and all employers and bring the labor
lawyer and his client into both state and local, as well as federal, forums.
As a result, Maryland employers and their counsel are for the
first time confronted with various procedural problems resulting from
the plethora of legal remedies available to an employee alleging dis-
crimination. An employer may well find himself defending the same
allegedly discriminatory act in a number of forums, either simultane-
ously or consecutively. The disposition of a charge in one forum may
* Partner, Frank, Bernstein, Conaway and Goldman; A.B., Johns Hopkins
University, 1953; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1958.
** Associate, Frank, Bernstein, Conaway and Goldman; B.S., University of
Pennsylvania, 1963; LL.B., University of Maryland School of Law, 1967.
1. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended and
re-enacted by the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), ch. 120, 61 Stat.
136 (1947), and last amended by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1964). See Guss v. Utah Labor Bd., 353 U.S. 1(1957) ; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters
Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
2. See Note, Municipal Fair Employment Practice Ordinances and Commis-
sions: A Legal Survey and Modern Ordinance, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 258 (1970).
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not preclude another forum from rendering a decision conflicting
with the prior one. The applicability of traditional legal concepts such
as exhaustion of remedies, election of remedies and res judicata has
sometimes been rejected in the employment discrimination area.
In short, the labor lawyer and his client are faced with the
problem of "multiple jeopardy" in employment discrimination cases.
It is the purpose of this article to discuss the procedural problems
which have arisen in these cases and to recommend solutions which
are fair to all concerned.
I. REMEDIES AVAILABLE To EMPLOYEES IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES
One cannot appreciate the complexity of the procedural problems
arising in employment discrimination cases until he is aware of all
the remedies which are available to an employee. Since the availability
of such remedies is, in part, dependent upon the location of the
employer's business, let us assume that the employer's operations are
located exclusively in Baltimore City. An employee who has suffered
employment discrimination may resort to any one or more of several
agencies, tribunals, or courts.
1. The EEO C and the Federal Court - Title VII
Civil Rights Act of 1964
The most well-known of all employment discrimination legislation
is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 which established the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter EEOC).
Title VII applies to any employer engaged in an industry affecting
interstate commerce who has twenty-five or more employees,4 and de-
clares that it shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the
following acts because of an individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin:
a. to fail or refuse to hire any individual;
b. to discharge any individual;
c. to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment;
d. to limit, segregate or classify employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive them of employment oppor-
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1964)
(enacted as Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701 et seq., 78 Stat. 253).
The cases discussing Title VII refer to those section numbers which are contained
in the Act as enacted by Congress (Pub. L. 88-352) and that practice will be followed
in this article.
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(b). However, the Act excludes from its
definition of the term "employer" (1) the United States or a corporation wholly
owned by the United States; (2) Indian tribes; (3) state and political sub-divisions;
and (4) private membership clubs exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, other than labor organizations. It also should be
noted that the statutory prohibitions are applicable as well to labor unions and em-
ployment agencies.
[VOL. XXXI
EMPLOYEE DISCRIMINATION
tuities or otherwise adversely affect their status as an
employee; or
e. to discriminate against any individual as to admission or
employment in any program established to provide apprentice-
ship or other training.'
The Act further provides that it is an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to print or publish or cause to be printed or published
any notice or advertisement relating to employment which indicates
any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on
race, color, religion, sex or national origin except where religion,
sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification for
such employment.
6
An employee alleging discrimination against a Baltimore City
employer covered by Title VII may not file a charge with the EEOC
without first resorting to the Maryland or Baltimore City agency
charged with the responsibility of enforcing the state or city law pro-
hibiting the alleged unlawful employment practice in question.7 Upon
the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced
under state or city law or upon the termination of state or local
proceedings, whichever is earlier, the employee may file a charge in
writing under oath with the EEOC. However, the charge in any case
must be filed within 210 days after the occurrence of the alleged
discriminatory act or within thirty days after receiving notice that
the state or city agency has terminated its proceedings, whichever
is earlier.8
Once a charge has been timely filed with the EEOC, the EEOC
furnishes a copy of the charge to the employer and conducts an
investigation. If it finds that there is "reasonable cause to believe
that the charge is true," the Commission is required to attempt to
eliminate the charged discriminatory practice by informal methods
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703 (a), (d). In order to avoid unnecessary con-
fusion, this article will not discuss the Equal Pay Act of 1963 which, in general,
prohibits an employer covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act from engaging in
wage discrimination based on sex. The Equal Pay Act overlaps with Title VII in
terms of prohibited conduct but is different in terms of jurisdiction and procedure.
6. Id. § 704(b).
7. Id. § 706(b). For a good discussion of this and other procedural issues arising
under Title VII, see Comment, A Primer to Procedure and Remedy Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 U. PiTT. L. REV. 407 (1970).
8. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(d). The EEOC has adopted regulations pro-
viding that where a charge is initially filed with the EEOC but deferral to a state
agency is required, the EEOC will transmit the charge to the state agency and then
consider it as automatically filed with the EEOC on the termination of the state
proceedings or after 60 days, whichever occurs first. Where such a charge is filed
with the EEOC more than 150 days after the alleged offense but less than 210 days
therefrom, the EEOC will consider the charge to have been filed with it on the 209th
day following the alleged offense. EEOC Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12
(1971). There is a serious question whether this attempt by the EEOC to preserve
charges which otherwise might be untimely comports with the language of Title VI.
A decision by the Tenth Circuit that such procedure is improper is now pending before
the Supreme Court. Love v. Pullman Co., 430 F.2d 49 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. granted,
401 U.S. 907 (1971). See also Comment, A Primer to Procedure and Remedy Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 U. PITr. L. REV. 407 (1970).
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of conference, conciliation and persuasion. 9 If the Commission is
unable to obtain voluntary compliance with Title VII, it must notify
the aggrieved employee that he may institute a civil action within
thirty days in the United States District Court against his employer."°
Such notice will in any event be issued by the Commission at any
time after the expiration of sixty days from the date of the employee's
filing of a charge or upon the Commission's dismissal of the charge,
when demanded in writing by the employee." Should the court find
that the employer has intentionally engaged in the unlawful employment
practice charged, it is authorized by statute to enjoin the employer
from engaging in such practice and to order such "affirmative action"
as may be appropriate, including the reinstatement or hiring of the
employee, with or without back pay.'2 In addition, the court may allow
the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.3
2. Federal Court - Civil Rights Act of 1866 -
42 U.S.C. § 1981
A part of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,"4 which
was re-enacted with minor changes by section 16 of the Enforcement
Act'5 and is now codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1981, provides that all
persons shall have, inter alia, the same right to make and enforce
contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens. Prior to 1968, section 1 of the
1866 act was interpreted as prohibiting discrimination only if effected
by state legislation or state action.' 6 However, on June 17, 1968,
the Supreme Court held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 7 that a
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(a).
10. Id. § 706(e). The EEOC proceedings leading to a civil suit by the aggrieved
party, discussed in the text above, may be initiated by the filing of a charge by a
member of the EEOC who has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of Title VIIhas occurred as well as by the filing of a charge by the aggrieved party himself.
However, only the aggrieved party may file a civil suit. Id. §§ 706(a), (e).
In addition, the Attorney General of the United States is authorized to bring
a civil action in the appropriate District Court of the United States where he has
reasonable cause to believe that an employer is engaged in a pattern or practice of
resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by Title VII. Id. § 707(a).
11. EEOC Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25a (1971). This EEOC
regulation appears to ignore the statutory language of § 706(e) of the Act whichdirects the Commission to issue notice of the availability of civil suit, where it has
not secured voluntary compliance, no later than 60 days after a charge has been filed
with the Commission regardless of whether the Commission has received a demand
in writing from the aggrieved employee.
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g). See, e.g., Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat
and Frost I. & A. Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
13. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(k).
14. Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.15. Enforcement Act of 1870, Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144.
As enacted in 1866, the statute applied only to citizens. It was changed in 1870 to
apply to "persons" and, after being codified as Rev. Stat. § 1977 (1874), now reads:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, beparties, give evidence, and to make full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.
16. See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); Waters v. Paschen Con-
tractors, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 659 (N.D. Ill. 1964), and cases cited therein.
17. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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provision in section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, now codified as
42 U.S.C. § 1982,' s barred racial discrimination in the sale or rental
of property by private parties as well as by governmental bodies or
through governmental action. The basis of the Court's decision was
that section 1 was "meant to prohibit all racially motivated deprivations
of the rights enumerated in the statute," be it governmental or private. 19
The Court reasoned that since section 2 of the 1866 act specifically
exempted private violations of section 1 from criminal sanctions, section
2 would have made little sense had section 1 only been applicable to
governmental interference.
Since section 1981 was also a part of section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and its legislative history was identical to that of section
1982, it was inevitable that civil rights proponents would attempt to
revitalize section 1981 so that it too would apply to private as well
as public discrimination. In October, 1968, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, referring to Jones v. Mayer,
held that strictly private action interfering with the right to enter
into an employment contract gave rise to a cause of action under
section 1981.20 While some of the United States district courts have
held to the contrary,21 all of the United States Courts of Appeal which
have considered the question have held that section 1981 prohibits
private racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of employment
contracts.2 2 These decisions now have the additional support of the
Supreme Court's holding in the recent case of Griffin v. Breckinridge23
that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) prohibits private conspiracies entered into
for the purpose of depriving persons of the equal protection of the law.
An employee may sue his employer for alleged racial discrimination
in employment under section 1981 by filing suit in a United States
District Court and, because there is no statute of limitations specifically
covering suits brought under that section, federal courts are required
to refer to the applicable state statute of limitations to determine the
18. "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property."
19. 392 U.S. at 426.
20. Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968); see
Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discrimina-
tion Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1019 (1969) ; Note, A "New" Weapon to Combat Racial
Discrimination In Employment: The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 29 MD. L. REV. 158
(1969).
21. See, e.g., Smith v. North American Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D.
Okla. 1970) ; Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 63 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 9536 (E.D.
Pa. 1970), rev'd and remanded, 3 CCH EPD 8118 (3d Cir. 1971); Harrison v.
American Can Co., 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 9353 (S.D. Ala. 1969); Evans v. Local 2127,
IBEW, 313 F. Supp. 1354 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
Harrison and Evans have been overruled, in effect, by Sanders v. Dobbs
Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
22. Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 3 CCH EPD 1 8118 (3d Cir. 1971);
Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
948 (1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Wks. of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476
(7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
23. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). In Richardson v. Miller, 3 CCH EPD 1 8285 (3d Cir.
1971), the court relied upon Griflin v. Breckenridge in holding that a non-negro
plaintiff had stated a cause of action under section 1985(3) by alleging that he
was discriminatorily discharged because he opposed the defendants' racially discrimi-
natory employment practices.
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appropriate time in which a suit may be brought.24 In Maryland, the
question is open as to whether a suit based on section 1981 would
fall under the three-year statute of limitations generally applicable to
contract or tort suits25 or, as a suit to enforce a statutory right26 not
existing at common law, under the twelve-year statute of limitations
applicable to suits on specialties. The Maryland precedents are so
confusing that then-Chief Judge Thomsen of the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland stated, in a case involving section
1983, that he was unable to reconcile the Maryland cases.28 Thus,
it appears that the applicable limitation period under section 1981 must
remain unsettled until the courts decide this question or until the
legislature acts to settle the matter.29
In Jones v. Mayer the Court, while affording the plaintiff in-
junctive relief, specifically avoided deciding whether a party aggrieved
by a violation of section 1982 might also properly assert a right to
compensatory damages. However, recently the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that an employee is entitled to
both injunctive relief and damages under section 1981.30
3. The National Labor Relations Board
In Packing, Food and Allied Workers v. NLRB,3 1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that an
employer's practice of invidious discrimination on account of race or
national origin constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of
section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act.32 In finding
that such a practice violates this section, the court stated:
(1) racial discrimination sets up an unjustified clash of
interests between groups of workers which tends to reduce the
likelihood and the effectiveness of their working in concert to
achieve their legitimate goals under the Act; and (2) racial
discrimination creates in its victims an apathy or docility which
inhibits them from asserting their rights against the perpetrator
24. See West v. Board of Educ., 165 F. Supp. 382, 387 (D. Md. 1958); 2 J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 111 3.07[2], 3.07[3] (1970).
25. MD. ANN. CODE art. 57, § 1 (1968).
26. See Mattare v. Cunningham, 148 Md. 309, 129 A. 654 (1925).
27. MD. ANN. CODE art. 57, § 3 (1968).
28. West v. Board of Educ., 165 F. Supp. 382, 387 (D. Md. 1958). See discussion
of Maryland cases in Roland Elec. Co. v. Black, 163 F.2d 417, 423-27 (4th Cir. 1947).
29. The possibility of the federal courts' holding that the 12-year statute of
limitations applies could be eliminated if the Maryland legislature were to enact a
statute which provided that all actions brought under section 1981 shall be brought
within three years from the time that a cause of action accrues. Such action was taken
by the legislature in 1945 in regard to actions brought under the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964), after a Maryland court in Manhoff v.
Thomson-Ellis-Hutton Co., 6 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 61,498 (Sup. Bench of Balto. City
1943), and the federal court in Bright v. Hobbs, 56 F. Supp. 723 (D. Md. 1944),
had held that the right to bring an action under the FLSA was governed by the
12-year statute of limitations applicable to specialties. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 57,
§ 19 (1968).
30. Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 948 (1971).
31. 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964).
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of the discrimination. We find that the confluence of these two
factors sufficiently deters the exercise of Section 7 rights as to
violate Section 8(a) (1)..3
While the National Labor Relations Board has examined employer
discrimination in other contexts, 4 it has never advanced the theory
that discrimination itself violated section 8(a) (1) of the Act. Since
the Board's General Counsel did not proceed on such a theory, the
court remanded the case and instructed the Board to conduct a hearing
and determine whether the employer had a practice of invidious dis-
crimination based on race or national origin and, if so, to order an
appropriate remedy. Pursuant to these instructions the Board reopened
the record in the case but, pending a factual determination by the
trial examiner, refused to pass upon the legal issue of whether dis-
crimination by an employer against an employee solely on the basis
of the latter's race or national origin is, as a matter of law, a violation
of section 8(a) (1) of the Act.35 The majority of the Board's panel
did not feel bound by the court's legal conclusions.
If the court's rationale prevails, an employee may file an unfair
labor practice charge with the NLRB if his employer practices in-
vidious discrimination.86 If upon a preliminary investigation the
Board concludes that the charge has merit and is unable to resolve
the matter by settlement, it will issue a complaint against the employer
and conduct a full evidentiary hearing." It should be noted that the
Board is precluded from issuing a complaint based upon any unfair labor
practice which occurred more than six months prior to the filing of
the charge. 8
If, after conducting the evidentiary hearing, the Board finds that
the employer has engaged, or is engaging, in the alleged unfair labor
practice, it is empowered to issue a cease-and-desist order against
such practice and may also order affirmative action, including the
payment of back pay. 9 Decisions of the Board are reviewable by the
United States Courts of Appeals."
33. 416 F.2d at 1135.
34. See, e.g., Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 1962 CCH N.L.R.B. 1 11,848(1962) (when employer participates in a union's arbitrary action against an employee
in violation of the union's duty of fair representation, the employer violates section
8(a) (1) of the Act), enf. denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Sewell Manufactur-
ing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 1962 CCH N.L.R.B. 1 11,504 (1962) (an employer violates
the Act if during an election to certify union, the employer makes flagrant appeals to
racial prejudice). See also Fuchs and Ellis, Title VII: Relationship and Effect on the
National Labor Relations Board, 7 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 575 (1966).
35. United Packinghouse Food & Allied Workers, 1969 CCH N.L.R.B. 1 21,260
(1969). On June 30, 1970, Trial Examiner Alba B. Martin found that the employer
had a policy of invidious discrimination against its employees on account of their race
or national origin, and recommended relief. 1 CCH LAB. L. REP., EMPLOYMENT
PRaC'rcEs f 5085 (1970). The Board has not yet reviewed this trial examiner's
decision.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964); see NLRB Statements of Procedure, 29 C.F.R.
§ 101.2 (1959).
37. See NLRB Statements of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.4-101.8 (1959).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964).
39. Id. § 160(c).
40. Id. § 160(f).
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4. Federal Court - The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967"' applies
to any employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
twenty-five or more employees.42 The Act states that it is unlawful
for an employer to commit any of the following acts because of an
individual's age, where the individual is at least forty years of age
but less than sixty-five years of age,4" unless age is a bona fide
occupational qualification:
a. to fail or refuse to hire any individual;
b. to discharge any individual;
c. to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment;
d. to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply
with this Act."
It is also unlawful for an employer to print or publish, or cause to be
printed or published, any notice or advertisement relating to employ-
ment which indicates any preference, limitation, specification, or dis-
crimination based on age, except where age is a bona fide occupational
qualification for the particular business.48
An employee alleging age discrimination may institute suit in
federal court provided the following two prerequisites have been
satisfied and the Secretary of Labor does not bring an action on behalf
of the employee:
(1) the employee has instituted proceedings with the state agency
empowered to protect against age discrimination violations
and sixty days have run since the instituting of same, unless
such proceedings have been earlier terminated ;46 and
(2) the employee has given at least sixty days notice of intention
to sue to the Secretary of Labor. This notice must be filed
with the Secretary within 300 days after the occurrence of
the alleged discriminatory act or within thirty days after
notice of termination of proceedings under the State law,
whichever is earlier. 47
Once a notice of intention has been timely filed, the Secretary
of Labor notifies the employer of the charge and attempts to eliminate
41. Id. § 621 et seq.
42. Id. § 630(b). However, the Act excludes from the term "employer" (1) the
United States; (2) any corporation wholly owned by the United States; and (3)
state and political sub-divisions.
43. Id. § 631.
44. Id. §§ 623(a), (f).
45. Id. § 623(e).
46. Id. § 633(b).
47. Id. § 626(d).
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the unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference
and persuasion.4 1 Unlike the EEOC, the Secretary of Labor has
discretionary authority to institute suit on behalf of an employee who
claims that he has wages due as a result of the employer's violation
of the Act.49 If the Secretary elects to file such an action, the employee
is not permitted to bring an individual action despite his compliance
with (1) and (2) above. 50
Assuming that the employee has satisfied (1) and (2) above
and the Secretary of Labor elects not to bring an action in his behalf,
the employee may file his own civil action, provided such action is
instituted within two years after the occurrence of the alleged dis-
criminatory act or within three years in the event of a willful violation.5'
The employee may recover any wages due52 as well as reasonable
attorney's fees and court costs. 53 The court is authorized to grant any
legal or equitable relief which it deems appropriate including judgments
compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion. 4
5. Commission on Human Relations - Maryland Fair
Employment Practices Act
The coverage of the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act55
is very similar to that of Title VII of the federal act, with the
addition of the factor of age, except that this Act imposes greater
restrictions upon and covers more employers than do the federal acts
outlined above. 6 It applies to all employers of twenty-five or more
employees, regardless of whether they are involved in interstate com-
merce or an industry which affects interstate commerce ;57 it provides
no limitation period in which a complaint must be filed ;"8 and it pro-
hibits age discrimination regardless of the age of the employee in-
48. Id.
49. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1964),grants the Secretary of Labor those powers of enforcement outlined in sections 11(b),
16 (except 16(a)) and 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§211(b), 216, 217 (1964). See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1964).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1964).
51. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act adopts those provisions relating
to time limitations for the bringing of suits which are contained in section 6 of the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1964). See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1964).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1964).
53. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act adopts the provisions of section
16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1964), which grants
employees a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of the action where judgment is
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1964).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1964).
55. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 17-20 (1968 and Supp. 1970).
56. See Note 4 supra and accompanying text
57. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 18(b) (Supp. 1970). However, the term "em-
ployer" does not include the State or a bona fide private membership club (other than
a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation under § 501(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.
58. Although the statute fails to establish any time limitations whatsoever, it is
suggested that an aggrieved employee's rights of action do not continue in existence
forever. The equity courts charged with enforcing commission orders probably will
apply the doctrine of laches against those employees who do not pursue their claims
in a timely fashion.
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volved." The Act prohibits any of the following acts if based on an
individual's race, color, creed, sex, age or national origin:
a. to fail or refuse to hire any individual;
b. to discharge any individual;
c. to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges or employment ;60
or
d. to discriminate against any individual in admission to, or
employment in, any program established to provide apprentice-
ship or other training.6
Thc u~e of discriminatory notices and advertisements is also prohibited
by language substantially identical to that of Title VII, with the
addition of the factor of age.62
Where an employee feels that he has been discriminated against
in violation of the Act, he may file a complaint with the Commission
on Human Relations.6" Thereafter, the Commission's staff proceeds
to investigate the complaint, and the results are reduced to written
findings.6" If it finds that there is "probable cause" for believing that
a discriminatory act has been or is being committed, the staff is
required to attempt to eliminate such discrimination by "conference,
conciliation and persuasion."6 If the Commission is able to effectuate
an agreement eliminating the alleged discriminatory practice, such
agreement is reduced to writing and signed by the employer, after
which an order is entered by the Commission setting forth the terms
of the agreement.66
Where the Commission is unable to reach an agreement with the
employer, the staff enters findings of fact to that effect and the
employer will be required to answer the charges of the complaint in
a public hearing before the Commission. 7 Prior to the time that a
case is set in for public hearing, all activities of the Commission in
regard to investigations and attempts to eliminate the discriminatory
practice by conference, conciliation and persuasion are required to be
conducted "in confidence and without publicity;" the Commission is
required to hold confidential any information relating thereto, including
the identity of the employer and the employee involved, unless the
employer and the employee agree in writing to the release of such
information.6
59. Compare this with note 43 and accompanying text.
60. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19(a) (Supp. 1970).
61. Id. § 19(d).
62. Id. § 19(e).
63. Id. § 12(a). Where the Commission itself has received reliable information
regarding a violation of the Act, after investigation by its staff, it may issue its own
complaint. Id. § 12(b).
64. Id. § 13(a).
65. Id. § 13(b) (1968).
66. Id. § 13(c).
67. Id. § 14(a) (Supp. 1970).
68. Id. § 16.
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If, after a public hearing, the Commission finds that the employer
has engaged in a discriminatory practice, the Commission is authorized
to issue a cease and desist order against the employer and to take any
other affirmative action which will effectuate the purposes of the Act.69
If an employer refuses to comply with any order of the Commission,
the Commission may enforce the order by instituting litigation in the
appropriate equity court of the county (or of Baltimore City) wherein
the alleged discriminatory act took place. 70
6. Baltimore City Community Relations Commission
Article 4 of the Baltimore City Code7' applies to employers who
employ fifteen or more persons72 and prohibits the following employ-
ment practices based on an employee's race, color, religion, national
origin or ancestry, except when such factors are reasonably required
as an essential qualification in a particular occupation or position:
a. discriminating against an individual with respect to hiring,
tenure, promotion, terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employ-
ment;
b. denying or limiting, through a quota system or otherwise,
employment opportunities to any group or individual;
c. inquiries concerning, or the recording of the race, color, re-
ligion, national origin or ancestry of any applicant for employ-
ment; or using any form of application for employment for
personnel containing questions or entries regarding race, color,
religion, national origin or ancestry;
d. causing to be printed, published, or circulated any notice or
advertisement relating to employment which indicates any
preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based
upon race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry.7"
An employee alleging discrimination in any of these manners
may file a complaint with the Baltimore City Community Relations
Commission.74 Unlike under the state act,75 no complaint may be
filed unless it is filed within thirty days of the occurrence of the
alleged discriminatory act.7 6 After the timely filing of such complaint,
69. Id. § 14(e) (1968).
70. Id. § 15(a) (Supp. 1970).
71. BALTO. CITY CODE art. 4, §§ 8-21 (1966).
72. Id. § 9(2). However, the term "employer" excludes fraternal and religious
organizations, and parents, spouses or children are not counted in determining whether
an employer has 15 employees.
73. Id. §§ 10(l)-(3).
74. Id. § 17 (a). The Commission may issue its own complaint when it has reason
to believe that any person has engaged or is engaging in any unlawful practice.
Id. § 17(b).
75. See note 58 supra.
76. BALTO. CITY CoDE art. 4, § 16(2) (1966).
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the Commission by a majority vote may refer the matter to its staff
for investigation. The results of the investigation are reduced to
written findings of fact and where there is "probable cause" for believing
that an unlawful act has been or is being committed, the staff is
required to attempt to eliminate the unlawful practice by conference,
conciliation, and persuasion. Where agreement can be reached concern-
ing the elimination of such an unlawful practice, the agreement must
be reduced to writing and signed by the employer; thereafter, an
order is entered by the Commission setting forth the terms of
the agreement. 77
Where the staff is unable to reach an agreement with the employer
for the elimination of the unlawful practice, the matter is referred to
public hearing.78 If, after this hearing the Commission finds that the
employer has engaged in an unlawful practice, it may issue a cease-and-
desist order and take such further action as will effectuate the purposes
of the ordinance. 7' The Commission is specifically authorized in its
discretion to upgrade or to reinstate the employee discriminated
against, with or without an award of back pay."0 Should an employer
refuse to comply with any order the Commission may invoke the
aid of an appropriate equity court for enforcement. The court has
the power to pass an order enforcing, modifying, or setting aside, in
whole or in part, the order of the Commission."
It is interesting to note that the Baltimore City ordinance, unlike
the state act, fails to declare unlawful the above-mentioned employ-
ment practices when they are based on age or sex. For this reason,
it is arguable that the Baltimore City ordinance is completely pre-
empted by the state law, which provides that local laws dealing with
employment discrimination shall be preempted by the state law where
the local law. . . contains penalties, provisions, or applications less
restrictive or of lesser coverage than the comparable provisions
of the subtitle of this article.8 2
Such language demonstrates the legislature's intention to reserve to
itself the exclusive right to legislate in the area of employment dis-
crimination when a local law fails to meet the state standard. While
the Maryland Court of Appeals has been hesitant to apply the doctrine
of preemption, it has stated that ". . . there may be times when the
legislature may so forciby express its intent to occupy a specific field
of regulation that the acceptance of the doctrine of preemption by
occupation is compelled .. ,,s3 The above-quoted language certainly
appears to be a forcible expression of such intent and would suggest
that the Commission is operating entirely without authority.
77. Id. §§ 18(a)-(c).
78. Id. § 19(a).
79. Id. § 19(d).
80. Id.
81. Id. § 20.
82. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 28 (Supp. 1970).
83. Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 323, 255 A.2d 376, 385 (1969).
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7. Arbitration Tribunals or Federal or State Courts
If an employer is unionized, his collective bargaining agreement
will probably contain the usual anti-discrimination clause which pro-
hibits any discrimination based on race, creed, color, national origin,
sex and age. Under the typical labor agreement, when such a clause
has been violated the employee who has been discriminated against
is permitted to file a grievance; if the matter is not resolved under
the various steps outlined in the collective bargaining agreement, it
will eventually be resolved by an arbitrator. While most labor contracts
provide that the decision of the arbitrator is to be final and binding,
the employer or the union may file suit in either a federal court or
state court to review the decision where the arbitrator's award exceeds
the scope of the parties' submission or where the award does not draw
"its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." 4 Most collective
bargaining agreements provide a time within which a grievance must
be filed, usually a few days or perhaps up to a month. If the labor
agreement is silent on this question, arbitrators have generally deter-
mined that the grievance must be filed within a reasonable time, the
length of which would vary with the circumstances of the case.8 5
Once a grievance is filed, the normal labor agreement provides time
limitations for proceeding from one grievance step to another, culminat-
ing in arbitration. If these steps are not followed within the prescribed
time periods, the grievance will normally be dismissed. 6
Where a collective bargaining agreement contains the usual anti-
discrimination clause but does not contain provisions for arbitration,
the employee may sue directly for breach of contract. Such a suit
may be brought either in a state or federal court,8 ' and Maryland's
three-year period of limitations would apply regardless of where the
suit is filed. 8
II. FACETS OF MULTIPLE JEOPARDY AND
SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
Assume the following situation: an employee works for a com-
pany in Baltimore City which has a union contract containing what
has now become a standard clause prohibiting discrimination against
employees because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex or age.
The union contract also contains a typical grievance and arbitration
procedure whereby an aggrieved employee may ultimately refer the
matter for the consideration and decision of an impartial arbitrator.
84. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car. Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597(1960). See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ; United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
85. See Southside Distrib. Co., 68-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards ff 8372 (J.A.
Sinclitico, Jr., 1968), and cases cited therein; Macomber, Inc., 68-2 CCH Lab. Arb.
Awards 1 8476 (M.E. Nichols, 1968).
86. See F.E. Olds & Son, Inc., 70-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 1 8558 (H.M.
Somers, 1970).
87. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Jenkins v. Win.
Schluderberg-T.J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 559-60, 144 A.2d 88, 90 (1958).
88. International Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966);
see note 25 and accompanying text.
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The employer discharges the employee for alleged incompetence, but
the employee maintains that he was discharged because of his race.
The employee, who is well-informed on his legal rights, files the
following papers:
1. a grievance under his union contract;
2. a charge with the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission;
3. a complaint with the Maryland Human Relations Commission;
4. a complaint with the Baltimore City Community Relations
Commission;
5. a charge with the National Labor Relations Board;
6. a suit in federal court under section 1981 of the Civil
Rights Act.
A. The Right to Pursue Two Remedies Simultaneously
May the employee pursue these remedies concurrently so as to
place a burden of defending six actions at the same time on the employer
and his counsel or does the availability of one remedy preclude the
employee's resort to another?
1. Deferral to State Agencies Under Title VII
There is one situation in which the availability of a remedy clearly
requires an aggrieved employee to attempt to exhaust that remedy
before he resorts to another avenue of relief. An aggrieved employee
in Baltimore City may not file a charge with the EEOC unless he has
given the state or city agencies an opportunity to resolve the problem,
and no charge may be filed with the EEOC before the expiration of
sixty days after proceedings have been commenced with the state or
city agency unless such proceedings have been terminated prior to the
sixty day period. 9 As a practical matter, this deferral requirement
merely delays the filing of a charge with the EEOC for a period of
sixty days. The EEOC has entered into a memorandum of under-
standing with various State Fair Employment Practice commissions,
including the Maryland Human Relations Commission, outlining the
procedure to be followed where a charge is filed with the EEOC and
must be deferred to the state agency. This memorandum assures that
after the expiration of the statutory sixty-day period, the charging
party is permitted to press his charge with the EEOC if he so desires. 90
Since the normal employment discrimination case will not be resolved
within a sixty-day period, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at most gives
the state or city agencies a headstart on resolving the problem but does
not seriously deter an aggrieved person from concurrently pursuing
his remedies under Title VII.
89. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(b).
90. EEOC Policy on Deferral to State FEP Agencies, 111 2, 3, 2 CCH LAB. L.
REP., EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES ff 16,905.
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2. The Availability of a Grievance and Arbitration Procedure
The existence of a grievance and arbitration procedure in a col-
lective bargaining agreement is generally considered to preclude suit
based upon such agreement until the grievance and arbitration pro-
cedure has been exhausted. In a series of decisions, the Supreme
Court has made clear that there is a national policy of encouraging
private settlements of labor disputes arising under collective bargaining
agreements and that the federal courts should refrain from hearing
such cases as long as arbitration is available.9 Such abstention is
required even though section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act92 expressly
grants jurisdiction to the federal courts to hear such cases. The
Maryland Court of Appeals has announced a similar rule for the
state courts. 93 Therefore, on these same policy grounds it could be
argued that the availability of a grievance and arbitration procedure
should prohibit an employee from seeking any relief - from either a
court or an agency - in a discrimination case until he has exhausted all
rights under such procedure.
There is, of course, a difference between the collective bargaining
agreement cases decided by the Supreme Court and the Maryland
Court of Appeals and the employment discrimination situations under
discussion. In the collective bargaining agreement cases, the only
substantive rights possessed by the employee were created by the
agreement itself. Thus the only issue in those cases was whether the
employee's rights under the collective bargaining agreement were to
be ascertained under the contractual procedure or by a court. In
employment discrimination cases, however, employees have statutory
rights which are in addition to any rights under a collective bargaining
agreement. Although such a difference exists, the question still re-
mains whether the national policy favoring private settlement of labor
disputes should apply with equal force to employment discrimination
situations in which a contractual arbitration procedure is available
to the aggrieved employee.
There is a great deal of authority in cases involving the National
Labor Relations Board which may be helpful in answering this question
by analogy. Over a period of years, the Supreme Court has considered
the question of whether the NLRB could proceed on an unfair labor
practice charge when the activity involved was also a violation of a col-
lective bargaining agreement having a grievance and arbitration proce-
dure. Although the earlier cases indicated some indecision by the court
in answering this question, 4 a recent decision states clearly that the
NLRB could not be precluded from proceeding in such a case. In
91. E.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965) ; Smith v. Evening
News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 196 n.1 (1962) ; United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
93. Meola v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 246 Md. 226, 228 A.2d 254 (1967) ; Henthorn
v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 226 Md. 499, 174 A.2d 175 (1961); Jenkins v. Wm.
Schluderberg-T.J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958).
94. See NLRB v. C.&C. Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967); NLRB v. Acme
Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S.
261 (1964).
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NLRB v. Strong 5 the Court reviewed its earlier decisions and
concluded:
Hence, it has been made clear that in some circumstances the
authority of the Board and the law of the contract are overlapping,
concurrent regimes, neither pre-empting the other.96
Firing an employee for union membership may be a breach of
contract open to arbitration, but whether it is or not, it is also
an unfair labor practice which may be remedied by reinstatement
with back pay under § 10(c) even though the Board's order
mandates the very compensation reserved by the contract.97
Nevertheless, the NLRB has voluntarily adopted a policy of re-
fusing to proceed with unfair labor practice charges which are also
contract violations where the contract provides for grievance and
arbitration procedures. This policy is stated clearly in the following
quotation from the decision in Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. :
Thus, we believe that where, as here, the contract clearly provides
for grievance and arbitration machinery, where the unilateral
action taken is not designed to undermine the Union and is not
patently erroneous but rather is based on a substantial claim of
contractual privilege, and it appears that the arbitral interpreta-
tion of the contract will resolve both the unfair labor practice
issue and the contract interpretation issue in a manner compatible
with the purposes of the Act, then the Board should defer to the
arbitration clause conceived by the parties. 99
Thus the NLRB has achieved an accommodation between its
statutory powers and the national policy of favoring arbitration so
that the Board procedure will not be used simultaneously to correct any
violations of the National Labor Relations Act when arbitration
is available.
There have been a number of federal court decisions dealing with
the question of whether Title VII suits in federal courts should be
deferred pending resort to the grievance and arbitration procedures.
While these cases for the most part concern the binding effect of an
arbitration award on an employee who later seeks relief under Title
VII, the rationale and language of these cases is relevant to the
question of whether prior resort to the grievance and arbitration
procedures is necessary.
In Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc., °00 an employee
alleged racial discrimination when the company denied him a pro-
95. 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
96. Id. at 360.
97. Id. at 362.
98. 175 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 1969 CCH N.L.R.B. i" 20,675 (1969).
99. Id. at 26, 112. The NLRB has reaffirmed this position (by a 3-2 vote) in
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 1971 CCH N.L.R.B. ff 23,385 (1971).
100. 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970).
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motion. The Fifth Circuit held that the employee had separate rights'"°
under Title VII and his labor agreement and that a final decision via
arbitration of his claim under the labor agreement did not act as a bar
to a later suit to vindicate his Title VII rights. While the court noted
that the utilization of private grievance-arbitration procedures com-
ports with the national labor policy favoring arbitration and also with
the enforcement policy of Title VII favoring voluntary compliance
with the Act over compliance compelled by court orders, it emphasized
that the ultimate decision on questions of Title VII rights rested with
the federal courts. The clear inference from the court's rationale is
that arbitration is never a prerequisite to suit under Title VII.
In Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,10 2 employees claimed that they
were discriminated against by use of a job classification system. When
they filed suit under Title VII, the trial court required them to elect
whether they would proceed in the Title VII case or seek a remedy
under the collective bargaining agreement through arbitration. The
Seventh Circuit held that the trial court erred in requiring the employees
to make this election, stating that the employees should be permitted
to utilize dual or parallel prosecution in court and through arbitration
so long as an election of remedies is made after adjudication so as to
preclude duplicate relief. The court also stated that the analogy to
labor disputes involving concurrent jurisdiction of the NLRB and the
arbitrator was not merely compelling but was conclusive. It is interest-
ing to note that the Seventh Circuit made no reference to the policy of
the National Labor Relations Board, discussed above, of deferring to
arbitration whenever possible.
In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,'03 the Sixth Circuit held that
an arbitration award, if rendered within the scope of the contractual
provisions for grievance and arbitration submission, was binding on
the employee when he filed suit under Title VII. However, the court
carefully stated that the question was not whether arbitration and
resort to the courts could be maintained at the same time but whether
suit might be brought in court after a grievance was finally adjudicated
by arbitration. Thus the question of prior resort to grievance and
arbitration procedures was expressly left open by the Sixth Circuit.
In Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp.," a California
federal district court recognized the Seventh Circuit's position that
an aggrieved employee is entitled to pursue his remedies both through
grievance proceedings and through proceedings under Title VII, thus
indicating that deferral to arbitration is not required.
While the foregoing authorities indicate that a federal court in a
Title VII case need not require exhaustion of an arbitration remedy
prior to entertaining suit, the validity of these decisions is questionable.
101. The Court said, "In view of the dissimilarities between the contract griev-
ance-arbitration process and the judicial process under Title VII, it would be fallacious
to assume that an employee utilizing the grievance-arbitration machinery under the
contract and also seeking a Title VII remedy in court is attempting to enforce a single
right in two forums." Id. at 312-13.
102. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
103. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam (4-4), 401 U.S. 932 (1971).
104. 3 CCH EPD ff 8071 (C.D. Calif. 1970).
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The cases holding that the NLRB need not defer to arbitration pro-
ceedings are not truly analogous to cases arising under Title VII.
The NLRB has absolute control over cases involving violations of
the National Labor Relations Act. If the General Counsel of the
NLRB refuses to issue a complaint, his decision is final, and an
aggrieved party may neither force him to file suit105 nor file suit in
his own name. 0 6 Since the NLRB is the expert tribunal for the
decision of cases involving claimed violations of the National Labor
Relations Act, the courts recognize the specialized competence of
the NLRB in this area and give great weight to its decisions. 1 7 On
the other hand, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has
virtually no control over Title VII litigation, and the EEOC does not
serve as the expert tribunal for the decision of cases involving Title
VII violations.'"8 Title VII cases are tried before the federal district
courts which cannot claim specialized competence in cases of this nature
similar to that possessed by the NLRB. In reality, a Title VII
proceeding is little more than the ordinary type of civil litigation
based upon a statutory right. Therefore, it may be argued that,
because of the court's lack of expertise, the national policy of en-
couraging the settlement of labor disputes through arbitration need
not be sacrificed; and that this policy requires the federal courts in
Title VII cases to defer to arbitration where the statutory basis of
liability and the contractual basis of liability are the same. An argument
to the contrary, that a plaintiff in a Title VII case may be acting
as a representative of others who are also discriminated against and
that therefore the court should retain jurisdiction over such a pro-
ceeding as one in the nature of a class suit, would have merit only if,
in fact, the arbitrator were powerless to award relief against a general
practice of discrimination. However, there would appear to be no
reason why a grievance could not be filed by a group of employees
or by a union acting as the representative of all of the employees in
a class. In fact, it is a common occurrence for unions to arbitrate
grievances involving employees as a group. It is therefore suggested
105. E.g., Mayer v. Ordman, 391 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
925 (1968) ; Balanyi v. Local 1031, IBEW, 374 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1967). In Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967), the Supreme Court said: ". . . the Board's General
Counsel has unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice
complaint."
106. Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)
(1964), expressly provides that only the NLRB shall have the power to issue a
complaint. This provision, coupled with the Supreme Court's rule that courts are
generally preempted from hearing cases involving conduct prohibited or protected
under the National Labor Relations Act, permits individual court suits in only a
number of special situations. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) ; San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
107. See, e.g., Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793 (1945).
108. A bill has been passed by the House of Representatives, H.R. 1746, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), which gives the EEOC the authority to file suit under
Title VII and drastically changes the rights of individual employees in discrimination
cases. BNA Retail Lab. Rep. No. 1159, p. C-i (Sept. 23, 1971). Another bill, S.
2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), giving the EEOC authority to enforce its own
orders and making other important changes in Title VII suits, has passed the Senate
Labor Committee. Id. No. 1164, pp. A-13--14 (Oct. 28, 1971).
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that in a Title VII suit the court should ascertain whether effective
relief against the alleged discrimination is available to the employee
through arbitration, and that, if it is, the court should require
exhaustion of the grievance and arbitration procedures.
A deferral to arbitration is also suggested for the state and local
agencies enforcing the anti-discrimination laws in their respective
jurisdictions. It is true that the discretionary authority and powers
of these agencies approach those of the National Labor Relations
Board. Nevertheless, the Board itself has adopted a policy of refusing
to proceed with cases involving statutory violations which are also
contractual violations where the contract provides for grievance and
arbitration procedures. The adoption of a similar policy by state and
local anti-discrimination agencies will serve as a practical and efficient
method of reducing the multitude of concurrent legal remedies available
in cases of this type.
3. Exhaustion of Title VII Remedies in Section 1981 Suits
As noted earlier,'0 9 the current view among the federal courts of
appeals is that section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 permits
suits in federal court based upon private racial discrimination in
employment. The question then arises whether an employee seeking
relief under section 1981 is compelled to first file a charge with the
EEOC if his employer is covered by Title VII. It is possible to read
the 1964 and 1866 Acts together and conclude that it was the in-
tention of Congress that the conciliation machinery of the EEOC
be employed before suit in federal court could be maintained under
either of the two Civil Rights Acts. On the other hand, since
Congress has not expressly required such exhaustion by section 1981
plaintiffs it is arguable that this Congressional silence means that
no duty to exhaust EEOC remedies exists.
The federal courts have reached different conclusions on this
issue. In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works,"' the Seventh Circuit
concluded that because of the stress placed in the legislative history
on conciliation efforts by the EEOC, had Congress been aware during
the debates of the existence of a cause of action under section 1981,
it would have modified the absolute right to sue under that section
to the extent of requiring prior resort to the EEOC conciliation
machinery. Consequently, the court expressly held as follows:
... in order to avoid irreconcilable conflicts between the provisions
of section 1981 and Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust his
administrative remedies before the EEOC unless he provides a
reasonable excuse for his failure to do so."'
The court also held that the plaintiffs in this case had presented alle-
gations sufficient to justify their failure to file a charge with the EEOC
against their union, one of the defendants in the case, since they had
109. See note 22 supra.
110. 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
111. Id. at 481.
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already filed a similar charge against their company, another defendant,
for allegedly conspiring with the union to maintain a discriminatory
employment policy. The court believed that under these circumstances
the union must have been aware of the nature of the problem and
could have rectified the results of any acts of discrimination on its
part. Thus the court concluded that requiring the plaintiff to file
another charge at the EEOC level against the union would have been
an unnecessary observance of technicality.
The Third and Fifth Circuits, however, have refused to follow
the Waters rationale. In Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co.," 2
the Third Circuit held as follows:
We conclude that nothing in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 imposes any jurisdictional barrier to a suit brought under
§ 1981 charging discrimination in private employment."'
But the court emphasized that the conciliation machinery existing under
Title VII should not be ignored in a section 1981 suit and that
therefore the courts, in granting equitable relief, particularly prelim-
inary injunctions, should encourage in appropriate cases a resort to
the EEOC during the pendency of section 1981 cases so as to effectuate
the policies of both statutes. In Caldwell v. National Brewing Co.," 4
the Fifth Circuit agreed in toto with the position of the Third Circuit
and expressly rejected the contrary position of the Seventh Circuit.
4. EEOC Conciliation Efforts and Title VII Suits
Unfortunately, it appears that further concurrent remedies are
available to an employee under Title VII alone. The courts have
permitted individual employee suits in Title VII cases where the
EEOC has not yet begun its conciliatory efforts. It is at this point,
after an employee has filed suit, that he has in effect concurrent
remedies because the EEOC is still free to pursue conciliation on the
employee's behalf." 5
In Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 6 the Fourth Cir-
cuit court held, by a two-to-one vote,1 7 that an individual employee may
file suit where the EEOC has not yet undertaken conciliation attempts
because of its workload, as long as the employee has been notified of
his right to sue. The majority of the court found that the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, although extremely ambiguous,
suggested a statutory purpose of insuring timely remedial action. For
this reason, the majority concluded that an individual should not be
precluded from filing suit merely because the EEOC has not been
112. 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971).
113. Id. at 763.
114. 3 CCH EPD 11 8241 (5th Cir. 1971). The Fifth Circuit's decision was fore-
shadowed by a similar holding of one of the district courts of that circuit, in Banks v.
Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 3 CCH EPD J 8211 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
115. Cf. McGriff v. A.O. Smith Corp., 3 CCH EPD 1 8124 (D.S.C. 1971).
116. 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969).
117. Judges Craven and Winter constituted the majority while Judge Boreman
was the dissenter.
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able to achieve conciliation, no matter what the reason for its failure.
The dissenting opinion emphasized that the purpose of the legislation,
as illustrated by it legislative history, was to encourage conciliation in
order to prevent a multitude of civil suits, and that this policy would
be undermined if an employee were allowed to file suit before the
EEOC had a chance to reach a private settlement. The Fifth Circuit
in Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc.,'" and a California federal district
court in Noon v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 019 have also held that actual
conciliation efforts by the EEOC are not a prerequisite to suit under
Title VII.
Because of the confused and self-contradictory legislative history
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964120 it is impossible to ascertain any
clear Congressional intention respecting this matter. The legislative
history emphasizes the value of providing for both conciliation attempts
by the EEOC and the right of an aggrieved individual to seek prompt
relief through the judicial process. Yet these two values are basically
contradictory, in that a deference towards one must necessarily limit
the other. While the cases referred to above indicate that no actual
conciliation attempt is necessary, the matter will remain in doubt until
the Supreme Court settles the dispute.
B. The Effect of Settlement
Whether or not an employee's charge of discrimination is valid,
it may well be advisable for an employer to attempt to settle the charge
in order to avoid adverse publicity and litigation.
1. Subsequent Proceedings Under the Same Statute
Assume in our hypothetical situation that the employee properly
filed a charge with an appropriate agency (other than the EEOC)' 2'
alleging a discriminatory act. What happens if the employer decides
to reach a private settlement with the employee in order to avoid litiga-
tion? Would such a settlement be a defense to any subsequent pro-
ceeding based on the alleged act brought under the same statute?
In resolving this question, one must recognize that the positions
of the employer and of the employee in a discrimination case are
significantly different from that of the parties in normal civil litigation.
In the latter situation, the aggrieved party is suing to vindicate a
personal right and has exclusive control over the status of his case;
therefore, he is in a position to settle his claim on any basis considered
fair by him. However, in employment discrimination cases based upon
a statute which has given primary jurisdiction for enforcing the statute
to an agency, the agency and not the employee controls the outcome
of the case. From an analysis of decisions involving other agencies
118. 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 951 (1970).
119. 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 9313 (C.D. Calif. 1969).
120. Compare the majority and dissenting interpretations in Johnson v. Seaboard
Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968).
121. Because of the atypical nature of a Title VII proceeding, EEOC cases are
discussed separately, infra at note 129 et seq.
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charged with enforcing statutory rights, it would appear that only the
agency can effectively settle an employee's claim regardless of any
private settlement between the employer and the employee.
For example, the National Labor Relations Board in dealing with
the usual unfair labor practice charge is not bound by any settlement
reached between the parties themselves ;122 moreover, the NLRB may
agree to settle such a case without the consent of the charging party
and even against his wishes. 1 3 These powers exist because, under
the litigation machinery set forth in the National Labor Relations
Act, the Board is in complete charge of the proceeding and is entitled
to make discretionary decisions as it sees fit. Similarly, employee
settlements of wage claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act do
not seem to be binding on any one, under decisions of the Supreme
Court, 124 unless the settlement is effected by the Secretary of Labor
acting in the interests of the employee. 1 25 The rationale behind the
NLRB and the FLSA cases is that there exists a public, as well as
a private, interest in the resolution of such controversies and that
there are dangers in permitting employees to settle their claims, since
their bargaining position may be inferior to that of their employers.
The Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act and article 4 of the
Baltimore City Code follow the orthodox rule in this area. Section 13
of the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act 126 provides that if
the Commission on Human Relations finds probable cause for be-
lieving that a discriminatory act has been committed, the Commission's
staff should endeavor to eliminate the discrimination by conference,
conciliation and persuasion. If an agreement is reached for the elimina-
tion of such discrimination, the agreement must be reduced to writing
and "signed by the respondent," and an order must be entered by the
Commission setting forth the terms of the agreement. Since only
the respondent's signature is required, it seems clear that technically
the Commission can agree to a settlement contrary to the wishes of
the charging party. Once such an agreement is reached by the Com-
mission, no further litigation is available under the Maryland act
since section 14127 states that a hearing should be held only "[i]n case
of failure to reach an agreement for the elimination of the acts of dis-
crimination. . . ." It is clear, therefore, that the Maryland Commission
may reach a binding settlement of a dispute without the concurrence
of the charging party and thereby bind him for purposes of the
Maryland act. On the other hand, the Maryland Commission could
122. E.g., NLRB v. Revlon Products Corp., 144 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1944); NLRB
v. General Motors Corp., 116 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1940). An exception occurs regard-
ing jurisdictional disputes in that section 10(k) of the National Labor Relations
Act prevents the NLRB from acting in such a case if the parties reach a voluntary
adjustment of the dispute. 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1964).
123. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.7, 101.9(c) (1) (1971). The authority of the NLRB to
settle a case without the concurrence of the charging party is the logical extension
of its authority to dismiss a charge against the wishes of the charging party, dis-
cussed infra.
124. D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946) ; Brooklyn Savings Bank v.
O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
125. Fair Labor Standards Act § 16(c), 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1964).
126. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 13(b) (1968).
127. Id. § 14(a) (1970 Supp.).
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proceed with a hearing under the act regardless of any private settle-
ment entered into between the charging party and his employer since the
agreement referred to as precluding a hearing is, by the wording of the
statute, obviously an agreement reached by the Commission.
Similarly, article 4 of the Baltimore City Code 2 empowers the
Baltimore Community Relations Commission's staff to endeavor to
eliminate discrimination by conference, conciliation and persuasion.
Where agreement is reached it need only be "signed by the respondent,"
thus enabling the Commission to agree to a settlement despite the
personal desires of the complainant. Once such agreement is reached,
no further litigation may be pursued and, in effect, the complainant
is bound regardless of his nonconcurrence. However, as under the
Maryland act, the Baltimore City Commission could proceed with a
hearing regardless of any private settlement since the agreement which
terminates all litigation, by the wording of the ordinance, is one which
is reached by the Commission.
The role of the EEOC in the settlement of Title VII cases is
not clear. Unlike the typical state agency, the EEOC does not have
exclusive control of the litigation arising under the statute which
it administers. The aggrieved employee, and not the EEOC, is the
moving party in bringing a suit to court. 1 9 Thus the question arises
of whether a settlement by the employee without the concurrence of
the EEOC, or by the EEOC without the concurrence of the employee,
would be binding in a Title VII proceeding.
It has not been decided whether a private settlement between the
employer and the employee would preclude the employee from there-
after pursuing his claims under Title VII. However, the Federal
District Court for South Carolina has recently stated in dictum that
such a private settlement would preclude a subsequent suit. 130 On one
hand, since Title VII gives the employee exclusive authority to file
his own suit after receipt of a thirty-day suit letter, he is not in a
position much different from that of any other plaintiff involved in
normal civil litigation. For this reason, he should be in a position to
waive his claim unless public policy forbids such a result. On the
other hand, recognizing the public harm implicit in employment dis-
crimination, as well as the inferior bargaining position of many em-
ployees vis-A-vis their employers, an analogy can be drawn to those
Fair Labor Standards Act cases' 3 ' in which the Supreme Court has
held that an employee's release does not afford a defense in subsequent
litigation against his employer.
As for a settlement by the EEOC alone, it seems that such a
settlement is not binding on a non-consenting employee whether reached
before or after the employee first had the right to institute suit. The
language of Title VII clearly dictates a different result where settle-
ment has been reached prior to the employee's acquiring the right to
institute suit - that the EEOC can preclude an employee's right
128. BALTO. CITY CODE art. 4, § 18 (1966).
129. See note 10 and accompanying text.
130. McGriff v. A.O. Smith Corp., 3 CCH EPD 8124 (D.S.C. 1971).
131. See note 124 supra.
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to sue when it has agreed to a settlement with the employer. TitleVII permits an employee to file suit only after the EEOC notifies him
that it has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance.13 2 Where the
Commission has entered into a prompt settlement with an employer,
it could not possibly send such notice, and therefore the employee
would appear to be precluded from instituting suit. In support of this
argument, it should be noted that the statute does not provide that the
charging party must concur in a settlement in order to validate it.'33Despite the statutory language, it has been held that a settlement
reached by the EEOC alone before an employee has the right to
institute suit does not preclude him from filing a Title VII suit. In
Cox v. United States Gypsum Co.,' the employee plaintiffs filed aTitle VII suit before the issuance of a thirty-day suit letter from the
EEOC. The defendant employer had consented to a proposed con-
ciliation agreement with some changes, but the plaintiffs rejected theproposed agreement. The defendant contended that "conciliation" had
been reached between the Commission and itself and that the plaintiffs
were therefore barred from seeking judicial relief since Title VII onlypermits the issuance of a thirty-day suit letter when the Commission
itself has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance. A federal
district court in Indiana rejected this argument and held that TitleVII did not prohibit a private suit where the EEOC and the employer
agree to a proposal which is totally unacceptable to a charging party.
In reaching its holding the district court concluded that Title VIIdoes not mean what it says,' 35 since the legislative history indicates that
Congress intended the individual employee to be the moving forcein a Title VII proceeding with the EEOC acting only as an
informal negotiator.
Where an EEOC settlement is reached after the Commission has
already notified the employee that it was unable to obtain voluntary
compliance, it is clear that the employee may exercise his right to sue.
In McGriff v. A. 0. Smith Corp.,'"6 various charges were filed with
the EEOC alleging racial discrimination on the part of an employer.
The EEOC sent out a suit letter when the matter was not settled
promptly. As a result of conciliation efforts by the Commission
occurring thereafter, the employer and the Commission entered into
an agreement. The agreement included a provision stating that the
charging party waived the right to sue the employer with respect
to any matters alleged in the charges filed with the EEOC subject
to performance by the employer of its promises, contained in the
agreement. However, this agreement was not executed or approved by
132. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(e).133. Id. That section provides that the EEOC shall send a 30-day suit letter if
"the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this title"(emphasis added).
134. 284 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd on this point, 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir.
1969).
135. It is amusing to note that the district court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment, based on clear statutory language, with the following comment: "The defendantU.S. Gypsum has no authority to support this position other than the language of the
act itself." 284 F. Supp. at 83.
136. 3 CCH EPD ff 8124 (D.S.C. 1971).
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the charging party. Thereafter, the charging party filed suit under
Title VII. The South Carolina federal district court held that the
settlement agreement did not bar the suit since the charging party
did not execute it or agree to it. Nevertheless, the court refused to
grant injunctive relief on the ground that the conciliation agreement
effectively resolved the problem in the case and that, therefore, no
injunctive relief was necessary unless the employer did not comply
with its agreement in good faith.
2. Subsequent Proceedings in a Different Forum
This discussion has concerned only the effect of the settlement
of an individual's complaint filed with a particular tribunal on future
proceedings before that same tribunal. Will the settlement of a case
before one tribunal also be determinative of the result in a proceeding
brought by the same individual before another tribunal? At present
this appears to be an open question, due to the sparsity of authority.
In Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp.,'" a New York federal district
court held that a state agency settlement would be binding in a subse-
quent civil action brought under Title VII. An employee filed a
complaint with the New York Division of Human Rights charging
employment discrimination by her employer. During the course of
the ensuing proceeding, the employee and the employer executed a
"stipulation of settlement" which was enforced by an order of the
Division. Thereafter, the employee sued in federal court under Title
VII. The court held that the stipulation of settlement barred the Title
VII suit since the employee had voluntarily entered into the settlement
in the state proceeding. The court reasoned that even though there
was concurrent state and federal jurisdiction and that, therefore,
there may be two proceedings which exist contemporaneously for
some period of time, when one proceeding has gone to judgment the
other must come to an end.
In Washington v. Aerojet-General Corp.,13 an employee agreed
to the settlement of his grievance under a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Holding that he was bound by this settlement for purposes
of a Title VII case, the California federal district court said:
Initially he may pursue his remedies in both forums but at some
point a choice must be made. This point, as in the case of con-
current jurisdiction between State and Federal courts, is reached
when a litigant has pursued his remedies in one forum to decision,
be it by settlement, the decision of an arbitrator, or the decision
of a judge.13 9
A different conclusion may be indicated by the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc. 4 ' In holding
137. 321 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
138. 282 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Calif. 1968).
139. Id. at 523 (emphasis added).
140. 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970). See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
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that an arbitration award does not preclude an employee's suit under
Title VII, the court said in dictum:
• . . nor is an intermediate grievance determination deemed "set-
tled" under the bargaining contract to be given this effect. 4 '
The basic policy question regarding the use of settlements as
defenses in employment discrimination cases seems to center around
the procedural fairness of the settlement and the position of the
aggrieved employee as a representative of the public in addition to
his position as a private litigant. The question of procedural fairness
is not a new one in the law, and it should be relatively easy to decide
whether a given settlement was a fair one. If an employee seeks the
aid of his union, an administrative agency, or a court in correcting
the discriminatory acts of his employer, and if during the course of
such a proceeding the union, agency or court approves a settlement,
it is submitted that the employee should be bound by that settlement
in his capacity as a private litigant. It would also seem that he should
be bound despite his representing the public interest, for the following
reasons: (1) if there are other individuals being discriminated against,
they would be in a position to proceed in their own behalf; (2) neither
a union, an agency nor a court is likely to approve a settlement which
would leave unresolved a problem of widespread discrimination; (3)
the Attorney General of the United States,142 the EEOC,113 and state
agencies such as the Maryland Commission on Human Relations4
have the authority to initiate their own proceedings if there is wide-
spread discrimination on the part of an employer. Thus the public
interest and the interests of others similarly situated can be preserved
despite the settlement of any one particular suit.
A special problem exists regarding the effect on Title VII cases
of settlements reached by the Maryland Commission. In a memo-
randum of understanding entered into between the EEOC and the
Maryland Commission, the statement is made that settlement of a case
on terms satisfactory to the state agency shall not be deemed dispositive
of the charging party's rights under Title VII unless the charging
party has accepted the terms as being equitable and has voluntarily
executed a written waiver upon a form to be supplied by the Commis-
sion. 4  At first blush, this statement would seem to afford a ready
method of simultaneously ending liability under both the state act
and Title VII, since the only requirement is that the employee must
have accepted the settlement - a result which would probably follow
as a matter of course before the State Commission would agree to a
settlement. However, this procedure is not presently available because
the Commission has thus far failed to supply a form for the voluntary
141. 428 F.2d at 311.
142. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 707.
143. Id. § 706(a).
144. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B § 12(b) (1968).
145. EEOC Policy on Deferral to State FEP Agencies, ff 6, 2 CCH LAB. L. REP.,
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 11 16,905.
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waiver. It seems that the Commission is so suspicious of the abilities
of the state agencies that it has refused to supply them with such a form.
C. The Effect of a Final Decision in one Forum on Subsequent
Litigation in Another Forum
The ultimate question raised by the hypothetical situation is
whether an employee who has pursued one of his available procedural
remedies to a conclusion (other than a settlement) and has obtained
either a favorable or unfavorable decision may thereafter resort to
another forum which initially was available to him. A first reaction
might be that the employee is precluded from doing so by res judicata
principles. However, it must be remembered that, technically, res
judicata is a principle which applies only to the binding effect of a
judicial decision upon subsequent litigation. In employment discrim-
ination cases, the first decision may well be rendered by an arbitrator
or an administratve agency, neither of which are courts. Regarding
the binding effect of an administrative agency's decision, federal de-
cisions were not, until recently, completely clear, 146 but in 1966 the
Supreme Court at last stated without qualification that res judicata
is a principle which is applicable to the decisions of administrative
agencies acting in a judicial capacity. 147 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland, on the other hand, has stated repeatedly that administrative
agency decisions, being non-judicial, are not entitled to res judicata
effect. 14  Generally, a court will not hear an arbitration case until
the arbitration procedures have been exhausted, 149 and even then the
court will only review the award to assure itself that there are facts
to support the arbitrator's findings and that the award is within the
"essence of the contract."' 0  The courts, in effect, hear such cases
almost as if they were an appellate court reviewing a nisi prius decision,
and the issue of res judicata does not arise.
Nevertheless, there is analogous precedent suggesting that an arbi-
tration award should be given binding effect in subsequent litigation.
Although the Supreme Court has stated that the National Labor Re-
lations Board is not required to follow an arbitration award,'" it
146. See, e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940);
Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370 (1932);
Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1947); K. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 18.02 (1958).
147. United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966). See
also Painters District Council No. 38 v. Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081
(5th Cir. 1969) ; Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969) ; K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW, § 18.02 (Supp. 1970).
148. E.g., Gaywood Community Ass'n, Inc. v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 246
Md. 93, 227 A.2d 735 (1967); Knox v. Baltimore, 180 Md. 88, 23 A.2d 15 (1941).
See generally Cohen, Some Aspects of Maryland Administrative Law, 24 MD. L. REv.
1, 20 (1964).
149. See note 91 supra.
150. E.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1969).
151. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964). See also NLRB
v. Hribar Trucking, Inc., 406 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Illinois Ruan Transp. Corp.
v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1968) ; F.J. Buckner Corp. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 910
(9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1084 (1969).
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has also recognized and approved the validity of the long-standing
policy of the National Labor Relations Board of following an arbitra-
tion award where the proceedings were fair and regular and the decision
was not clearly repugnant to the purposes of the National Labor
Relations Act.152 The Labor Board has, in fact, stated that it has a
"policy of encouraging the finality of settlements reached through
voluntarily agreed-upon dispute settlement machinery."' 3
In determining whether an arbitration award will be given binding
effect in Title VII litigation, a number of federal courts have used the
doctrine of election of remedies in reaching their decisions. The
Restatement of Judgments provides as follows:
Where the plaintiff obtains judgment for the payment of
money against the defendant in an action to enforce one of two or
more alternative remedies, he cannot thereafter maintain an action
to enforce another of the remedies. 1
54
and:
Where a judgment on the merits is rendered in favor of the
defendant in an action to enforce one of two or more alternative
remedies, the plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action to
enforce another of the remedies.' 55
Thus the general policy of this equitable doctrine is that a plaintiff
may choose one of a number of alternate avenues of relief, but once
a decision is reached in the proceeding which he has chosen, he is
bound by that decision.
This approach was followed by the Sixth Circuit in Dewey v.
Reynolds Metals Co.,'56 where an employee claimed that his em-
ployer had wrongfully discharged him because of his religious beliefs.
The employee filed a grievance under the provisions of his collective
bargaining agreement; the grievance was subsequently dismissed by
an arbitrator. Contemporaneously with the submission of his grievance,
the employee applied to the Michigan Civil Rights Commission for
the issuance of a complaint against his employer based on identical
facts. The Commission found insufficient grounds on which to issue
a complaint and denied the application. The employee then initiated
a proceeding under Title VII which eventually resulted in his filing
suit in the federal court. The Sixth Circuit held that the complaint
should be dismissed because of the prior arbitration award. It stated
that if the arbitrator had granted an award to the employee, his
employer would have been bound by the award. Consequently, the
court held that where a grievance is based on an alleged civil rights
violation and the parties consent to arbitration, the arbitrator has the
152. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1964).
153. Local 1522, IBEW, 180 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 1969 CCH N.L.R.B. ff 21,450, at
27,442 (1969).
154. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 64 (1942).
155. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 65(1) (1942).
156. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam (4-4), 402 U.S. 904 (1971).
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right to reach a final determination of the merits of the allegations.
Otherwise the employer, but not the employee, would be bound by the
arbitration award. The dissenting judge refused to find that the
employee had made an election of remedies because his rights under
the collective bargaining agreement and those created by Title VII
were separate and distinct. When the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in the Dewey case, it was expected that a resolution of the conflict
between the majority and dissenting opinions would be forthcoming.
However, an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth
Circuit per curiam, Justice Harlan not having participated in the con-
sideration of the decision of the case. Thus the issue remains open. The
Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its position in Spann v. Kaywood Division,
Joanna Western Mills Co.,'57 where the arbitrator had given the
grievant part, but not all, of the requested relief.
Other federal court decisions on this question are conflicting. In
Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp.,' 58 a California federal
district court dismissed a complaint under Title VII where the
plaintiff had filed grievances under a contractual grievance procedure
and obtained the relief sought without the necessity of arbitration, and
nevertheless had sued in federal court under Title VII claiming the
same acts of discrimination. The court relied upon the doctrine of
election of remedies, stating that while an aggrieved party is entitled
to pursue his remedies both through grievance proceedings and through
proceedings under Title VII, he should not be able to subject his
employer to multiple actions based upon the same claim where he
has pursued his remedies in one forum to a decision. The court further
stated that the use of this doctrine should not depend on whether the
result in the grievance procedure was favorable or unfavorable.
There is some doubt as to whether the decision of the Seventh
Circuit in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. 59 is contrary to the two
decisions just mentioned. In that case, the court held that a plaintiff
could utilize dual or parallel prosecution both in court and through
arbitration so long as an election of remedies was made after adjudica-
tion so as to preclude duplicate relief, which would result in an unjust
enrichment or windfall to the plaintiff. It is not clear whether the
court would permit a plaintiff to obtain two judgments and then select
the one he likes best, or whether the court would dismiss a second
proceeding once the first proceeding had gone to judgment.
The Fifth Circuit, however, has clearly stated that it will not
follow the doctrine of election of remedies in employment discrimination
cases. In Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc. 60 an employee
lost his claim of discrimination in an arbitration proceeding under
his collective bargaining agreement. He later filed suit under Title
VII. The court held that the employee's invocation of his contractual
157. 3 CCH EPD 1 8314 (6th Cir. 1971).
158. 3 CCH EPD 8071 (C.D. Calif. 1970).
159. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
160. 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1969). See Tockman, Multiple Equal EmploymentOpportunities In Illinois, 54 ILL. BAR J. 24, 36-37 (1965). For a contrary view, seeGould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 24 ARB. J.(n.s.) 197, 214-18 (1969).
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remedies did not bar him from seeking a Title VII remedy in the
federal courts. The court referred to the difference between a trialjudge's responsibility in a Title VII case to resolve the employment
dispute in the public interest and the arbitrator's duty in the grievance-
arbitration procedure to carry out the aims of the agreement. The
court concluded that such an employee should not be penalized for
resorting to his contractual remedies, through application of either the
doctrine of election of remedies or the principle of res judicata.
It is submitted that an arbitration or agency decision in an
employment discrimination case should preclude a subsequent decision
by another tribunal in a factually similar case involving the same
persons, on the grounds of either res judicata or election of remedies.1 6'
Because of the distinctive substantive and procedural law applicable
to cases of this type, it is further submitted that analogies from
other areas of the law are of dubious value. The principles which
should be emphasized are those of affording the individual a fair hearing
and of avoiding endless multiple litigation; where the individual has
had a fair hearing, further litigation should be precluded.
It has been argued that an employee cannot receive a fair arbitra-
tion hearing in employment discrimination cases because the arbitration
process is deficient, in that (1) the arbitrator's function is to resolve
conflicts between union and management so as to promote industrial
harmony rather than to protect the rights of an individual employee;
(2) the arbitrator may attempt to "curry favor" with union and
management, at the expense of the individual employee, in order that
he will be chosen to arbitrate future disputes; (3) the individual
employee has no voice in determining either the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement or the selection of the arbitrator; (4) the in-
terests of the employee may so conflict with the interests of the union
as to prevent his claims from being pressed to the fullest extent possible;
and, finally, (5) the entire arbitration procedure is usually informal,
without rules of evidence and often without sworn witnesses, and
many times neither the employee's representative at the hearing nor the
arbitrator have formal legal training.' It is submitted that such an
indictment of the arbitration process is based upon theory rather than
practice. Most of the arguments are directed toward alleged procedural
"deficiencies" in the arbitration process. It is the writers' experience
that as a general rule such fears are unfounded, because: (1) the
employee's claims are persuasively presented by an attorney or a union
representative trained in this area; (2) the informality and absence
of legal rules of evidence at an arbitration hearing do not prevent
discovery of the truth, and sometimes further it; and (3) the fact
that arbitrators are selected by the parties tends to insure their fairness
and competence, since unfair and incompetent arbitrators are not often
161. There is a paucity of state court decisions on this point. Compare Cluett,
Peabody & Co. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 59 Misc. 2d 536, 299
N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (an arbitration award did not bar a complaint filed
with a state agency) with Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Div., Avco Corp., 63 CCH Lab.Cas. T 9480 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1970) (an arbitration award was binding upon a state
agency under res judicata principles).
162. See Note, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1316 (1970).
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selected. That the union's interest may be antagonistic to that of the
aggrieved employee is not peculiar to employment discrimination cases.
For example, such conflicts exist when the union represents employees
covered by its labor agreement but not members of the union or
employees who belong to a minority political faction within the union
itself. Despite its personal antipathy toward an employee's claim, a
union generally arbitrates the claim fairly in order to avoid a suit by
the employee against the union. Thus as a practical matter the arbi-
tration process works, and the Supreme Court has recognized this by
declaring a national labor policy which encourages and promotes arbi-
tration. In short, despite any theoretical limitations, arbitration affords
the individual the opportunity for a fair hearing.
EEOC Finding of "No Reasonable Cause"
A related problem exists in a Title VII action where the EEOC
has made a finding that there is no reasonable cause to believe that
discrimination has taken place. Under its procedure, if the Commission
makes such a finding it dismisses the charge. Upon the dismissal of
a charge the charging party may demand, and the EEOC will issue,
a notice that the EEOC is unable to obtain voluntary compliance
notwithstanding that the reason for dismissal is the Commission's
belief that no violation occurred. 163
Since EEOC conciliation efforts are an essential element of the
Title VII procedure, should an employee be able to sue when the
EEOC has found that conciliation is unnecessary? Although there
are some federal district court decisions to the contrary, 64 recent
circuit court decisions are unanimous in holding that an employee may
maintain a Title VII suit despite a finding of no reasonable cause by
the EEOC.' 65 The courts recognize that the statute itself does not
provide an answer to the problem and that the legislative history is
too confusing and contradictory to lend much help. Therefore, they
have made the assumption that Congress intended to entrust enforce-
ment of Title VII rights to the federal courts, upon proper application
by the individuals involved, rather than to the EEOC.
D. The Defense of Limitations
As discussed in the first part of this article, the availability of each
of the various remedies established for employees in employment dis-
crimination cases is (with the glaring exception of proceedings brought
under the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act) conditioned upon
163. EEOC Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.19d, 1601.25a(c) (1971).
164. E.g., Chavez v. Rust Tractor Co., 62 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 9400 (D.N.M. 1969);
Green v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 299 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
165. Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Const. Corp., 3 CCH EPD 8092 (5th Cir. 1971);
Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970) ; Flowers v. Local 6,
LIUNA, 431 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1970). A majority of district court opinions have
reached this same conclusion. See, e.g., McDonald v. American Fed'n of Musicians,
308 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Ill. 1970) ; Brown v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 305 F. Supp.
827 (D. Colo. 1969) ; Ross v. Continental Tel. Serv. Corp., 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 9376(D.N.M. 1969); Walker v. Keathley's, Inc., 62 CCH Lab. Cas. f 9405 (W.D. Tenn.
1969); Grimm v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 300 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Calif. 1969).
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the aggrieved employee's having initiated the prosecution of his charge
in conformity to certain time requirements. An employee who is tardy
in instituting proceedings under a particular statute will be precluded
from seeking relief under that statute. Thus the availability of the
defense of limitations should be considered carefully by an employer's
attorney. While the defense of limitations may somewhat reduce an
employer's exposure to "multiple jeopardy," since the availability of
some remedies is subject to a short limitations period, there is little
likelihood that statutes of limitations will serve as a panacea for the
ills of such exposure until a considerable amount of time has elapsed.
All Maryland employers are subject to suit under section 1981 and
will be exposed to the possibility of such suit for at least three years
following the incident.'6 6 Moreover, unless the Maryland legislature or
courts establish some time limitation for the filing of complaints under
the state act, 6 7 exposure to liability theoretically will never end for
those Maryland employers covered by the act.
In considering the defense of limitations, the attorney will have
to determine the amount of time which has elapsed since the occurrence
of the allegedly discriminatory act. When doing so, he may well
encounter the problem of the so-called "continuing offense." This
expression is often used to cover two different types of situations:
( 1) a series of repetitive discriminatory acts, each of which has adverse
consequences and (2) a single discriminatory act with continuing
adverse consequences. In the first type of situation - an example of
which would be the discriminatory layoff of an employee followed by
repeated discriminatory failures to recall the employee to available
work - each failure to recall would constitute a separate violation.
Consequently, limitations would begin to run anew as of the date of
each violation. 6 8
As an example of the second type of situation, the failure to
promote an individual because of his race could cause damage to him
throughout his employment. It therefore could be argued that this
situation is analogous to the first type of situation and that limitations
begin to run anew on each day that damage is suffered. If the employee
in our hypothetical situation were so discriminated against during ten
years of employment, the argument would be that actions based upon
discrimination occurring during the last three years of employment
might not be barred by limitations even though actions for discrimina-
tion occurring during the first seven years would be barred. This
argument has not been accepted by the courts, however, and the law
is settled that limitations begin to run from the time when the wrong
is initially committed.'6 9 This proposition was illustrated clearly in
West v. Board of Education,170 decided by the Maryland federal district
166. But see notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
167. See note 58 supra.
168. E.g., Cox v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969); Sciaraffa v.
Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891 (D. Me. 1970).
169. E.g., Pickett v. Aglinsky, 110 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1940) ; Muskin Shoe Co. v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 167 F. Supp. 106 (D. Md. 1958); Winand v. Case, 154
F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1957).
170. 165 F. Supp. 382 (D. Md. 1958).
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court, where a teacher alleged that she had been damaged during
many years of her teaching career as a result of a discriminatory rating
given to her early in her career. Then-Chief Judge Thomsen held that
her claim was barred by the statute of limitations even though she
continued to receive a lower salary over a period of years close to
the time of suit. The court held that under the Maryland decisions
there was no question but that the period of limitations ran from the
time when the wrong was committed and the cause of action accrued.
Conclusion
The employment discrimination laws and other legislation provide
a multitude of remedies to employees alleging discrimination. The
decisions to date generally have failed to require aggrieved employees
to exhaust one remedy before proceeding to another. Even worse, there
is a serious question of whether the settlement or determination of one
employment discrimination action will preclude the prosecution of a
similar charge by the same person in another proceeding. Thus labor
lawyers and their clients are confronted with a legal nightmare. It can
only be hoped that in the years to come legislative and judicial bodies
will reach a reasonable resolution of the problem and will reduce some-
what the employer's dilemma. Until then, attorneys and their clients
in employment discrimination cases will have to learn to live under the
burden of "multiple jeopardy."
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